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HEARINGS ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
BEFORE SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER 
August 24, 1981 
STATEMENT OF ACTING CHAIRMAN J. CLAY SMITH, JR. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
J 
I am J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a five-member 
bipartisan Commission having principal responsibility for the 
administration and enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting 
--discrimination in employment, including Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Since the early days of our 
existence as an agency, we have recognized that harassment in the 
workplace, which is based on race, religion, national origin, 
color, or sex, constitu~es a violation of Title VII because it 
imposes an adverse term or condition of employment on one class 
of people which is not imposed on any other classes of people. 
It unfairly handicaps and disadvantages those people against whom 
it is directed, often making it impossible for -them to perform 
their jobs. While the Commission continues to actively oppose 
harassment in the workplace on any Title VII basis, I will limit 
my testimony today to harassment on the basis of sex which takes 
the form of sexual harassment. 
That sexual.narassment is widespread is ~ot to be denied. 
According to Lin Farley, the author of Sexual Shakedown, uIn ~y 
1975 the Women's Affairs Section of the Human Affairs Program at 
d ' 'b d h f' .i. Cornell University· ~str~ ute t e ~rst quest~onna~re ever 
devoted solely to the topi~ of sexual harassment ... 70 percent 
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(of the respondents had) personally experienced some form of 
harassment". 11 In 1976, Redbook magazine published a question-
naire on sexual harassment to which over 9,000 women responded. 
Of this number, one in ten reported that they had experienced 
unwanted sexual attentions on the job.2/ Additionally, a statis-
tically significant st,,;:dy conducted by the U. SO. Merit Systems 
Protection Board shows that during the two years prior to the 
survey, which was done in early 1980, 42 percent of .all federally 
employed women surveyed reported that they were victims of 
se~ual harassment.~/ Also during the late 1970's cases involving 
sexual harassment were decided in six Federal Circuit Courts and 
seven additional cases were decided in Federal District Courts. 
In addition to this activity in the courts, in 1979 the 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Post 
Office and Civil Service held hearings on sexual harassment in 
the F~deral government. These hearings establi$hed that sexual 
harassment was widespread in the Federal government and established 
the need for guidance from our- Connnission with respect to this 
issue. The Commission realized, however, that any guidance which 
was issued with respect to sexual harassment would necessarily 
apply equally to all employers covered by Title VII, and we 
further realized, from the activity in the couris, that both 
public and private employers were in need of help,_: in understanding 
and dE-fining their liability for acts of sexual harassment in 
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the workplace- and were in need of help in determining how to 
mitigate that liability. Therefore, the Commission decided that 
guidelines should b~ issued to give employers notice of the 
guidance and to give them an opportunity to comment along with 
other members of the public and Federal agencies. Since guide-
lines are regularly published in the Federal Register for public 
notice and comment and~are also regularly circulated to Federal 
agencies for comment, this format appeared to be the vehicle 
which would best serve the interests of all concerned. 
On April 11, 1980, the interim guidelines were published in 
the Federal Register for a 60 day period for public comment. In 
addition to the comments received from Federal agencies, the 
Commission received 168 letters in response to this publication. 
These comments came from persons throughout th~ public and private 
sectors. The single most prevalent group of comments to~k the 
form of praise for the Commission for publishing guidelines on 
the issue of sexual harassment and for the c~nt'ent of the guide-
lines. The Commission was gratified by this high degree of 
favorable response which the guidelines elicited, recognizing 
that this was an ~nusual phenomenon in recent Federal experience. 
The Final Guidelines were published in the, Federal Register 
, 
i. 
November 10, 1980. I will discuss them now, sJction-by-section. 
The first subsection of the guidelines states that sexual harass-
ment is a violation of Titie VII and defines sexual harassment as 
follows: 
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Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature con-
stitute sexual harassment when (1) sub-
mission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition 
of an individual's employmen~ 
(2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the 
basis for employment decisions affecting 
such indiviudal, or (3) such conduct has 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work 
perfo~nce or creating an intimidating~ 
hostile, or offensive working environment. 
A number of persons who responded t9 the publication of the 
guidelines suggested that this definition of sexual harassment 
should be more specific both as a general proposition and as a 
means for strengthening the guidelines, particularly-with regard 
to §1604.l1(a) (3),· the section which provides that, "Unwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitu;e harassment 
i. 
when ... such conduct- has the purpose or effect bf unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 
-~-
These comments wer~ carefully considered by the Commission, and 
after much consideration, the Commission decided that the defini-
tion should stand as written, with one word changed for the sake 
of clarity. This conclusion was based on two factors. First, 
the Commission has held in its decisions that this definition is 
applicable in cases of harassment based on national origin, race, 
and religion, since 1968, 1969, and 1971, respectively 4/, and 
the courts have also recognized this form of harassment as discri-
minatory.~1 At this time, the Commission sees no justification 
for treating harassment based on sex any differently than harassment 
based on race, religion, color; or national origin, for we agree 
with the following statement:' contained in the report of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare when Title VII was 
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972: If ••• 
discrimination against women is no less serious than other pro-
hibited forms of discrimination, and ... it is to be accorded the 
same degree of concern given to any type of sim~larly unlawful 
conduct."61 One court recognized this specific form of sexual 
harassmen~ prior to the issuance of the guidelinesII, and at 
least two courts have supported the definition since the guide-
lines were issued.8/ 
The second factor that played a part in th~ Commission's 
determination was the difficulty inherent in frLming a specific 
definition which does not include behavior which is perfectly 
accepta'ble social behavior and has no relevance at all to Title 
VII. This difficulty is due to the fact that ~he same actions 
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which, under one set of circumstances, would constitute sexual 
harassment, might, under another set of circumstances, constitute 
acceptable social behavior. Also, this is a developing area of the 
law, and the Commission wanted to give guidance without being so 
definitive that the guidelines would require amendments with each new 
development. Rather, as stated in Subsection (b) of the guidelines, the 
Commission will consider each case alleging sexual harassment on a 
case-by-case basis and consider such factors as the nature of the 
. alleged sexual advances and the context in which they occurred. This 
way the Commission will be able to issue and publish fact-specific 
decisions and further clarify and refine the definition through examples 
and discussion contained in the decisions. 
Since the publication of the final guidelines in November 1980, 
the Commission has issued five decisions.~ I have instructed staff 
to present additional decisions to the Commission for consideration 
so as to provide additional guidance for the public. These decisions 
all speak to areas of the guidelines which the Commission considers 
appropriate for further development or explanation through the kind of 
discussion that is not possible in a set of guidelines but is necessary 
to the resolution of an individual charge of discrimination. The 
Commission feels that well developed, fact-specific decisions are the 
appropriate vehicles for further refining the defipition of sexual 
! ; 
harassment. 
- 6 -
:!: 
I 
The gui~_~ines follow the well est_~lished common law 
standard of respondeat superior. That is, they state that an 
employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors and 
agents. This responsibility exists regardless of the existence 
of circumstances which would be mitigating factors if the person 
who committed the acts were not a supervisor or an agent, e.g. 
lack of knowledge of the acts on the part of the employer or 
publication of a policy prohibiting the acts. This is the 
standard which the courts have previously applied in all area·s of 
Title VII law. It is true that some courts failed to apply this 
standard in sexual harassment cases at the outset of the develop-
ment of this legal issue; however, it should be noted that some 
courts were initially slow to g~ant sexual harassment the same 
legal status as other Title VII issues on any front. 
MOreover, some courts did apply the respondeat superior 
doctrine prior to the issuance of the guidelines. For example, 
one court stated in 1976, "For, if this (sexual harassment) was a 
policy or practice of the plaintiff's supervisor, then it was the 
(employer's) policy or practice, which is prohibited by Title 
VII.nlO/ 
In other early sexual harassment cases the courts concluded 
that, " ... respondeat·superior does apply here, phere the 
action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to 
. 
hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in 
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or recommer such actions, even thoug~ vhat the supervisor 
is said to have done violates company policy"ll/ and that, 
"Generally speaking, an employer is chargeable with Title 
VII violations occasioned by discriminatory practices of 
supervisory personnel. "l2l The COlIDllents which dealt with 
employer liability for acts of supervisors and agents were 
read in conjunction with court precedent and Commission 
policy in· this and all other areas of T.;,:tle VII law, and the 
·Commission concluded that there was no justification for 
distinguishing the issue of sexual harassment from other 
Title VII issues. 
The application of the principle of respondeat superior 
in Title VII law is "far less onerous than in other areas of 
law, such as tort law, because there are no provisions in 
Title VII for punitive or compensatory damages, either as 
money payable to the employee above and beyond that which is 
actually lost or as fines. This means that where an employer 
knows of acts of sexual harassment which have been committed 
by a supervisor or an agent and rectifies the actual results 
of those actions, a further remedy under Title VII would be 
unlikely in the administrative process. Clearly, the Commission 
would not sue for a remedy which has already been granted. 
i 
,f 
Let me, at this point, EO back to the interim guidelines. 
As originally published, Subsection (d) of the guidelines 
provided that: 
~. 
\ 
With respect to persons other than those 
mentioned in subsection (c) above, (that 
is, supervisors and agents), an employer 
is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer, 
or its agents or supervisory employees, 
knows or should have known of the conduct. 
An employer may rebut apparent liability 
for such aces by showing that it took 
immediate and appropriate corrective action. 
The comments we received showed that we needed to clarify what we 
meant by our reference to "persons other than," and so we rewrote 
Subsection (d) and limited it to cover liability for sexual 
harassment by co-workers. We retained the provision that sets 
out the requirement for actual or constructive knowledge on the 
part of employer " and the provision for a defense which consists 
of a showing that the' employer took immediate and .appropriate 
corrective action when it discovered the violation. Then we 
added a new Subsection (e) to cover actions by persons who do not 
work for the employer, e.g., persons who regularly come to repair 
equipment or make deliveries at an employer's facility and harass 
an employee while they are on the employer's premises. We also 
retained the requirement in this subsection that employers have 
knowledge before liability can vest and retaine~ the provision 
I 
for a defense consisting of a showing of ~ediate and appro-
priate corrective action. In addition, we expanded the pro-
visions of the original subsection to state that, "i:'. reviewing 
-9-
these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the 
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the 
employer might have with respect to such non-employees." Clearly, 
control is a given in the case of an employee, but is not neces-
sarily present in the case of a non-employee and must be esta-
blished in order to establish a violation. However, where both 
knowledge and control do exist on the part of the employer, there 
is an obligation under Title VII for the employer to maintain an 
atmosphere that is free of sexual harassment, so that members of 
one sex are not required to work under different and less advan-
tageous terms and conditions of employment than members of the 
other sex. 
In connection with these two subsections, some commentors 
were concerned with what constitutes "appropriate corrective 
action. 11 If the action is "corrective," that is, if it in fact 
eliminates the illegal behavior, then it is appropriate; however, 
actions w~ich result in the elimination of the illegal behavior 
in one workplace might not have the same result in another work-
place. Since appropriateness will have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, we did not make any changes,in the original 
. 
language. J 
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Subsection (f of the guidelines provide that: 
Prevention °is the best tool for the el~in-
ation of sexual harassment. An employer 
should take all steps necessary to prevent 
sexual harassment from occurring, such as 
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing 
strong disapproval, developing appropriate 
sanctions, informing emy~oyees of their right 
to raise and how to raise the issue of harass-
ment under Title VII, and developing methods 
to sensitize all concerned. 
This subsection contains the major thrust of the guidelines, 
that is "Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of 
sexual harassment." The suggestions offered in this subsection 
give employers assistance in preventing an invidious form of 
discrimination that inflicts substantial psychological damage to 
its victims, in addition to the monetary damage that it inflicts. 
It is most important when considering the issue of sexual harass-
ment that we bear this psychological damage in mind and recognize 
that, while it is difficult to remedy, it can, in many cases, be 
prevented. 13/ 
. 
Some commentors requested greater specificity with respect 
to the examples of preventative action which an employer might 
take. The Commission decided that it wr.;uld not go beyond making 
the suggestions which were already set out in the guidelines. We 
do not want to require that employers take previ"6usly determined 
steps to prevent sexual harassment because the Commission feels 
that each wo~.~lace is unique, and step~ which might be effective 
in one workplace might fail in another. T~e cost factor was also 
considered. An extensive formalized training progr~ might be 
effective and appropriate in a large corporation, but a less 
expensive, informal means of communicating the employer's concerns 
to management and th~ employees might be more efficient and 
effective in a 'small business. I have also made both the 
Commissioners and staff available, within budget constraints, to 
speak to trade associations and other employer and employee 
groups to give furt~er examples and to discuss ideas which 
members of the groups have for preventing sexual harassment. 
Several people who submitted \~itten comments and a large 
number of members of the public who telephoned the Co~ission 
. asked whether employees who are denied an employment benefit are· 
covered by the guidelines when the benefit is received by a 
person who is granting sexual favors to their mutual supervisor. 
While we realize that this does not state a case of sexual 
harassment, since we assume that the employee who received the 
benefit is granting the sexual favors willingly and has not been 
coerced into the ~elationship, it is obviously related to that 
issue in the minds of the public~ Therefore, the Commission 
decided to add a new subsection, Subsection (g), to the guidelines 
to alert employers that this related issue is a~so covered by 
Title VII. This does not mean, and we did not state, that this 
necessarily presents a vioiation of Title VII. It merely means 
that the charge is cognizable und~r Title VII and, if brought to 
the Commission, will be decided under that statute. 
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It is important to understand that this provision affords 
protection for persons who are not involved in the situation but 
who, nevertheless, are adversely affected by the sexual conduct of 
others. Thus, it creates a balance of protection for all persons in 
the workplace. 
One criticism of the guidelines which was raised by a limited 
number of commentors during the formal comment period but which has 
been raised f·requently since the guidelines became final is that they 
will cause an influx of frivolous charges at EEOC. All charges that 
are filed in our field offices which involve the issue of sexual ha-
rassment are investigated in the field and then sent in to Headquarters 
for a decision on the merits by the Commission. In April of this year I 
instructed staff to read through all of the case files which were in 
Headquarters and to give me a sense of the contents of those case files. 
The following is the result of their reading. 
At that time there were 130 sexual harassment charges in Head-
quarters. Of these, 118 contained corroborative evidence that 
substantiated part, if not all, of the Charging Party's allegations. 
The evidence came in the forms 0f admissions by Respondent, statements 
of people who witnessed the sexual advances, statements of others 
subjected to the same or similar conduct as Chargin~ Party, and other 
i 
statements of corroboration. t 
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These cases, which are decided on the merits, cover a wide 
range of activity as demonstrated by the following: fifty-eight of 
these charges involved unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature, 
such as the touching of a person's buttocks or hugging or kissing; 
seventy-seven involved demands for a person to engage in a sexual 
act and the promise of a favorable employment decision if the demand 
is met or the threat of a negative action if the demand is not met; 
and twenty-six involved the use of vulgar language of a sexual nature, 
calling a person sexually derogatory names, making sexually derogatory 
comments about one sex, or displaying sexually explicit pictures, 
photographs, or cartoons. 
From another point of analysis, sev~nty-one of the charges were 
brought by women who.were fired; twenty-six were brought by women 
who resigned when the unwelcomed sexual activity became intolerable; 
nineteen were brought by women who either were given less desirable 
work assignments, had their number of hours of work reduced, or were 
transfered to a different work shift; seven were brought by women 
who were denied a promotion; and seven were brought by women who were 
subjected to sexual activity which interfered with their work 
performance or created an offensive working environment •. 
In the 118 charges which were corroborated, ~e acts of sexual 
harassment were perpetrated by supervisors or other management officials 
in 106 cases and by coworkers in 12 cases. 
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In conclusion, sexual harassment in the workplace is not a 
figment of the imagination. It is a real problem. The sexual 
harassment guidelines are designed to assist employers in their 
understanding of this sensitive public issue and to guide them in 
developing management training programs for their companies, and 
the Federal government. 
T~ank you. 
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